December 8, 2024, is a date Syrians will never forget—a day of liberation, marking the end of Bashar al-Assad’s decades-long reign. For the first time since the 2011 uprising, Syrians have begun to imagine a future free from the shadow of authoritarianism. Yet, as the delight of this historic moment fades, a darker reality emerges. Disinformation, a tool the Assad regime had wielded to control narratives and manipulate public opinion, did not disappear with his departure. Foreign actors, including Russia and Iran, were instrumental in amplifying Assad’s propaganda pre-fall, spreading narratives that framed opposition groups as extremists and foreign conspiracies. In the post-Assad era, misinformation adapted, and is spreading across platforms, being driven by new actors and methods, threatening to destabilize an already fragile post-conflict transition.
Social media, which had long been a double-edged sword for Syrians, remained central to this struggle, offering both the perk of genuine connection and the risk of misinformation. For years, platforms like Facebook, Telegram, and WhatsApp served as lifelines for information in a censored environment. But in the context of transition, uncertainty, and poor content moderation, they have become breeding grounds for disinformation campaigns designed to confuse and deepen societal divides.
In the post-Assad period, the disinformation ecosystem has evolved and taken new approaches. Unlike during Assad’s regime, when propaganda largely emanated from a centralized apparatus, the current landscape is fragmented, involving diverse actors with varied agendas. Non-state actors, including former regime affiliates and freelance operatives, have taken a prominent role, alongside classic state actors who have been leading in disinformation about Syria (including Russia, Iran, and Egypt, among other countries). Accounts from countries with no direct stake in Syria, such as India and Japan, have also entered the fray. This chaotic environment complicates efforts to discern credible information, leaving Syrians vulnerable to manipulation during a critical moment in their history.
Social media platforms remain the primary tools for communication and the primary conduits for disinformation. Verified accounts on X and Facebook, for example, amplify false narratives with visibility algorithms favoring their content over credible, but unverified, sources. Telegram, with its emphasis on anonymity, hosts channels that spread fabricated announcements and manipulated narratives, exploiting the platform’s lack of oversight. WhatsApp, in particular, poses unique challenges due to the private nature of its group chats, which are often inaccessible to fact-checkers and moderators. Misinformation and disinformation circulate rapidly within these closed networks, where their spread is amplified by the inherent trust in personal connections.
Sectarian-based disinformation exploiting the experiences of Syria’s minorities is among the most damaging. It not only fuels sectarian divides but also discredits legitimate accounts of human rights violations. While acknowledging the real violations that have occurred during security operations, it should be emphasized that disinformation harms victims most by distorting their stories and creating public skepticism. This undermines the credibility of any future reports, leading to widespread anticipation that even truthful accounts may be “fake news.” It can, on the other hand, hinder efforts to hold perpetrators of human rights violations during the Assad era accountable by portraying these accountability efforts as indiscriminate attacks on minorities.
For years, Assad had been portrayed as the guardian angel of Syria’s minorities, a narrative heavily promoted by his regime and its supporters. This messaging was directed not only at minority groups within Syria but also at Western audiences, framing Assad as a bulwark against sectarian chaos.
When the 2011 uprising began, the regime’s response was not limited to violence—it also relied heavily on disinformation. There were persistent efforts to isolate the Syrian revolution from the broader context of the Arab Spring, instead portraying it as a movement driven by sectarianism. Assad and his allies sought to dehumanize protesters and delegitimize their demands, using propaganda to propagate fear. Among the many examples etched into Syrian memory is a slogan allegedly chanted during the 2011 protests: “An Alawite to the coffin and a Christian to Beirut.” This phrase became a recurring tool in the regime’s campaigns to paint the revolution as extremist and sectarian. The ongoing disinformation in the post-Assad era continues to exploit this narrative, perpetuating the same divisive tactics.
A notable example targeting Syrian Christians is a report published early this year by Sputnik of the Hagia Sophia Church closure in Al-Suqaylabiyah, which claimed verbal threats forced its shutdown. Fact-check group Verify Syria debunked the story, revealing the decision came from the church’s owner, Nabel Al-Abdullah, a National Defense Militia leader.
Similarly, a video showing an alleged attack on an Alawi shrine in Aleppo sparked protests, but Verify Syria found it was taken out of context, with custodians clarifying it occurred weeks earlier during HTS-led operations in late November 2024.
In another context, a campaign was orchestrated to scare the country’s Shia population. False claims about a new supervisor for the Sayyida Zaynab Shrine were disproven.
False narratives like these exacerbate distrust between communities, fueling cycles of fear and hostility. These manipulations also undermine transitional justice efforts by framing accountability initiatives as attacks on specific groups.
One of the most emotionally charged forms of disinformation involves manipulated narratives about survivors from Assad’s prisons. A striking case involved a CNN report featuring Clarissa Ward, one of their better-known reporters, allegedly freeing a detainee. Many Syrians raised serious concerns about the authenticity of this story, and fact-checking by Verify Syria revealed that the detainee was, in fact, Salameh Mohammad Salameh, a former intelligence officer implicated in theft, extortion, and coercion. His brief incarceration was due to internal disputes within the regime, rather than any broader political repression.
In another case, an interview featured a man claiming to have been detained in the infamous Palestine Branch, a prison in the outskirts of Damascus. Verify Syria’s investigations identified him as Anas Majdhoub, a known informant for the branch, who had previously facilitated arrests and torture. These false survivor stories raise urgent questions about their motivations: Are they attempts by regime collaborators to seek impunity by posing as victims, or do they aim to discredit genuine survivor accounts of Assad’s atrocities?
For families of the missing, disinformation delivers cruel false hope. Rumors of secret detention cells in Sednaya Prison, for instance, have circulated persistently, despite extensive investigations by groups like the White Helmets and the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) finding no evidence. These narratives exploit the anguish of families desperate for answers, leaving them trapped in cycles of uncertainty.
Disinformation’s impact also threatens transitional justice. In the chaos following the regime’s collapse, many prisons and security branches were abandoned, with incriminating documents left behind. While some of these materials provided crucial evidence, others were destroyed or hidden in the confusion—sometimes by individuals implicated in detention and torture. This disarray, compounded by false narratives, risks eroding the evidence needed to hold perpetrators accountable, prolonging societal divisions and delaying justice.
From the start of the 2011 revolution, the Assad regime weaponized disinformation to delegitimize opposition groups by linking them to Israel. Early in the conflict, a fabricated story alleged that Israeli commanders orchestrated opposition activities in Baniyas, a city in the Tartous governorate, supported by a German naval vessel, with the aim of turning the town into a “new Benghazi.” This narrative reinforced the regime’s framing of the revolution as a foreign-led conspiracy.
This conspiracy kept circulating, accusing all anti-Assad groups of links and collaboration with Israel, including civil society, like the White Helmets, political opposition, and armed groups.
This tactic has persisted into the post-Assad era, evolving to exploit new uncertainties. In December 2024, as Assad fled Syria, social media saw a surge in claims targeting anti-Assad groups. One widely circulated falsehood alleged that Ahmed Al-Sharaa formerly known as Abu Mohamed al-Jolani, the head of HTS and the country’s president for the transitional phase, had coordinated with Israel. The claim, supported by a fabricated image falsely attributed to Alsharq News, collapsed under scrutiny when no such statement or photo could be found on the outlet’s platforms or official channels.
By framing the caretaker government and opposition groups as Israeli collaborators, these campaigns obscure the realities of Syria’s complex post-Assad landscape, deepening societal divides and distrust among political actors. Such tactics illustrate the enduring influence of the Assad-era propaganda apparatus, even as new actors and platforms adopt its methods.
Amid Syria’s economic devastation, disinformation preys on the vulnerable. Fraudulent job opportunities, fake financial aid offers, and scams targeting Syrians’ desperation for stability circulate widely on WhatsApp and Telegram.
The impact is profound: Syrians who fall victim to these scams face additional forms of harm, like data exploitation from phishing links, while the credibility of genuine aid organizations is undermined. Such disinformation not only worsens economic hardship but erodes trust in legitimate support systems.
Disinformation campaigns in Syria leverage a variety of sophisticated methods designed to create confusion and manipulate public perception. Common tactics include imposter content, the miscontextualization of information, and deceptive practices involving social media accounts, such as creating new profiles or repurposing older pages under different names.
Imposter content, where fake accounts pose as official entities, has become a common tactic. Telegram channels such as “Reporting Violations in Free Syria” and “General Security Administration,” posed as being affiliated with the caretaker government. However, both later announced that they have no formal connection to it, further muddying the waters of trust and credibility.
Misinformation that was spread on these channels was particularly concerning, due to the use of unauthentic announcements, inflammatory language, and baseless claims of documenting violations, all of which increased public anxiety and further eroded trust in such uncertain times.
Another example of imposter content has been the use of real media outlets’ logos on photos with false news. One widely shared narrative alleged that a female student in Tartus was abducted and sexually assaulted by a rebel. A fabricated post falsely attributed to Alsharq News circulated on Facebook, featuring a photo of a man, likely a fighter, alongside the text “Outrageous protests across Syria after an opposition member named Abu Albaraa Alafghani raped a student in Tartus.” However, there was no evidence of the news report or the accompanying image on Alsharq News’ official website. A reverse image search showed an array of posts using the same photo, including a post about Misrata, Libya. This deliberate falsehood not only manipulated public sentiment but also weaponized a fear of harassment against women.
Miscontextualization, defined by recycling old photos or videos in new contexts to create false claims, is another powerful tool. For instance, a widely circulated image from the 2013 massacre Assad forces committed in Baniyas, was recently used to allege a new sectarian attack in Homs.
Similarly, a photo of a woman lying on the ground unconscious was shared alongside claims of sectarian violence. Some posts claimed she was murdered, with varying narratives blaming Alawite or Sunni groups. Iranian websites shared the same image, alleging she was an Alawite killed during protests against the alleged attacks on an Alawi shrine. Investigations debunked all these claims, confirming that the photo showed a young woman in Homs who had lost consciousness, as corroborated by her mother.
During Syria’s reported internet outage on January 23, certain accounts seized the opportunity to spread fear and manipulate narratives. They framed the outage as a targeted action against Alawites, linking it to systemic violence. These accounts have been spreading sectarian-based disinformation, using it to urge minorities to arm themselves, join militias, or support movements advocating for the Syrian coast’s independence.
In the absence of effective platform moderation, Syrian civil society has stepped up to combat the ongoing information warfare. Organizations like Verify Syria have become vital in this fight, leveraging local expertise to fact-check and debunk false narratives. Their efforts go beyond correcting misinformation; they aim to foster a culture of media literacy, empowering citizens to critically evaluate the information they consume.
However, these organizations face significant challenges. Disinformation campaigns often target Verify Syria itself, accusing it of bias to undermine its credibility. Similarly, individuals exposing falsehood are directly targeted. For instance, a man from Ayn Al Sharqiyah, in Latakia, who posted a video challenging some false narrative about security operations in the town on January 14, 2025 was doxxed and harassed—along with others—by the group Independence of the Syrian Coast.
Additionally, the lack of cooperation from major platforms hampers civil society’s ability to address the root causes of harmful narratives. Despite these obstacles, Verify Syria’s work remains indispensable in safeguarding the truth and preventing disinformation from dragging the country into further escalation, which could lead to disruption of the critical transition.
The high stakes of disinformation in Syria
In many democratic states, disinformation is seen as a national security threat. In Syria, its consequences are even more dire. Decades of authoritarian rule have eroded trust in institutions, leaving citizens without reliable sources of information. Weapons remain widespread, raising the risk that false narratives could spark violence.
Disinformation’s power lies in its ability to manipulate public opinion, deepen societal fractures, and obstruct efforts to rebuild trust. As Syrians navigate this challenging transition, the stakes could not be higher.
Countering this requires urgent, coordinated action. Social media platforms must strengthen content moderation and transparency in conflict zones, ensuring they do not become amplifiers of harmful propaganda. The international community must prioritize support for Syrian fact-checking initiatives, independent journalism, and digital literacy programs, recognizing that safeguarding truth is an essential step toward peace. Grassroots organizations like Verify Syria play a vital role, but they cannot fight this battle alone—platforms, policymakers, and global institutions must step up.
The stakes are high. Disinformation does not simply distort reality; it endangers lives and derails the path to peace. If Syria’s transition is to succeed, truth must be reclaimed as a cornerstone of rebuilding, not only to counter today’s falsehoods but to lay the foundation for a society rooted in trust, justice, and shared hope for the future.
Noura Aljizawi is a Senior Researcher at the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy.