Ukraine Raises Its Defensive Game As Shahed Drone Attacks Intensify

In the first 11 days of September Russia has launched more than 400 Shahed attack drones at Ukraine. The rate of attacks is increasing; August saw almost 800 Shahed attacks in total, the highest this year. Russia is ramping up production of its long-range weapons and specifically targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in an attempt to freeze the country into submission this winter. At the same time Shahed attack profiles are changing to make them more effective.

Ukraine is fighting back. Not just with its own growing campaign of long-range drone attacks, but by switching tactics to fight the evolving Shahed threat with both kinetic and electronic means.

High Altitude Threat

The Shahed-136 is an Iranian design, and Russia initially imported complete drones from Iran. Later the drone parts were supplied by Iran and assembled in Russia, now they are manufactured under license at a giant new facility in Alabuga. The Shahed-136 had a seven-foot wingspan and cruises at a leisurely 115 mph with a distinctive sound which has led to the nickname ‘moped’.

Shaheds previously approached at very low altitude to avoid air defence radar. Some reports suggested the drones flew along river valleys to stay out of sight. In response Ukraine developed an innovative drone detection system: a countrywide array of thousands of networked microphones mounted on poles. These listen out for the Shahed’s engine sound, and a central air defence system correlates microphone data to track the route of each drone and calculate its likely target.

Mobile air defence groups with machine guns and automatic cannon then move into position to intercept the Shaheds, with data supplied via tablet computers. Drone attacks are almost always at night, so the defence groups are equipped with thermal imaging night sights. With many men at the front, some groups are composed of female volunteers.

But in recent months the Shaheds have started crossing Ukraine at high altitude and only descending over the target.

“Shaheds changed their tactics and fly over Ukraine at a height of 2 kilometers and often at 4-5 km [ 0ver 15,000 feet]. This is intended to avoid being hit by the mobile fire groups,” says Ukrainian analyst Serhii Flash in a recent post on his Telegram Channel.

Russian analyst “Russian Engineer” notes in his Telegram channel that the higher altitude attacks also mean the drones are too high to be picked up by acoustic sensors.

“It is necessary to increase the flight altitude by a certain amount, so that machine guns and MZA MTFs [mobile air defence groups] cannot reach them,” says Russian Engineer. “Only interception by missiles, both from air defense systems and from aviation, remains. Which in general plays into our hands, since the increased consumption of anti-aircraft missiles reduces the effectiveness of air defense.”

Stocks of air defence missiles like Patriot and Iris are extremely limited, and are conserved for ballistic missiles and other major threats rather than small drones. So Ukraine has changed tactics.

Aircraft Versus Drones

Ukraine’s Air Force has become a key player in the counter-drone campaign. The old prop planes mobilized to shoot down reconnaissance drones may not be able to catch Shaheds, but other types can.

Videos show Ukrainian helicopters shooting down Shaheds, and this now appears to be a standard tactic. High-flying drones are picked up by air defence radar and the Mi-8 helicopter is able to fly alongside while a door gunner blasts it with a machinegun. Mi-24 helicopter gunships are also used for this role, shooting down the drones with the 23mm cannon.

These encounters have been compared with an earlier drone campaign: the V-1 ‘Doodlebugs’ launched at Britain in 1944-45. Many of the V-1s were intercepted and shot down by Spitfires and other air defence aircraft. As they flew in a straight line the Doodlebugs were easy targets, but the risk was that the aircraft which shot one down might be damaged by the explosion of the 1,000-pound warhead. Pilots leaned to nudge the V-1 using a wingtip causing it to crash before it reached its target.

Ukrainian jet fighters also bring down Shaheds. A video from August 30 shows a MiG-29 shooting down a Shahed with an R-73 air-to-air missile at a range of about a mile.

These missions carry some risk. The first American-supplied F-16 loss in Ukraine occurred during a major Russian attack, though not as a direct result of enemy action. The details are not known, but it is likely that pilot Oleksiy Mes, callsign ‘Moonfish’, was killed by friendly fire. Deconfliction is not a trivial challenge when enemy drones and cruise missiles are sharing airspace in a fast-moving situation. (A video of an F-16 shooting down a Shahed with cannon fire circulating on social media appears to come from a video game. This would be a risky tactic in real life because of the risk of debris).

These tactics seem to have been successful. A report published in August indicated that the rate of shooting down Shaheds had risen into 91% in a six-month period, compared to 80% in the previous six months.

Interceptor FPV drones, which have recently brought down large numbers of Russian reconnaissance drones, lack the range and speed to tackle Shaheds. It seems highly likely that Ukrainian engineers are working on this challenge. Success could mean a dramatic shift in the drone war.

Directionless Drones

At the same time alternative means of stopping Shaheds also seem to be working even when they are not shot down. Recently we have seen increasing numbers of Shahed going off-piste and missing not only their targets but the country they were launched at.

3 of the Shaheds launched on the night of 11^th September reportedly looped around and ended up over Russia. During August, at least 12 Shaheds entered the airspace of Belarus, where some were intercepted by fighters. At least one Shahed flew over Polish territory on 26^th August. On 7^th September, Romania scrambled fighters as a Shahed crossed over the border. On 9^th September Latvian authorities confirmed that a Russian Shahed had crashed on their soil, hundreds of miles from Ukraine.

Some of these incidents may be due to the quality control issues that plague Russian manufacturing. The Alabuga factory employs the cheapest possible labor and build quality appears low. But many may be sent off course by electronic warfare. In February we described the nationwide Pokrova system designed to spoof drone satellite guidance systems and this appears to be just one of many such efforts. Ukrainian drones now rely on optical guidance systems which follow landmarks on the ground below, and the Russians may seek similar alternatives. Back in March some downed Shaheds were found with cameras as well as modems, indicating that the drones were evolving.

The Shahed barrage continues and is likely to get heavier. Ukraine will continue to tighten its defenses and achieve even higher kill rates, though a steady supply of Western air-defence missiles (and air-to-air missiles for F-16s) will be crucial.

In the long term though the best approach is likely to be to “kill the archer, not the arrow” –use long-range weapons to attack launch sites, storage and production facilities and stop the drones first.