Editor’s Note: Marc Martorell Junyent holds an MA in Comparative and Middle East Politics and Society from Tübingen University. A writer and researcher whose work has appeared in The New Arab, Jacobin, Responsible Statecraft, Democracy in Exile, and other publications, Marc has contributed to Stimson in the past, analyzing European policy toward the Middle East.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives project
European opinion toward Israel appears to be shifting in a more negative direction as the war in Gaza grinds on. But in Germany, where a new government was formed on May 6, foreign policy will likely feature more continuity than breaks with the past.
The new government is led by the center-right Christian Democratic Union and its sister party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), which together took 29 percent of the vote. Friedrich Merz, a 69-year-old West German with no prior experience in a governing coalition, is the new chancellor.
German political commentators expect Merz’s chancellorship to be strongly oriented towards foreign affairs in a context of uncertainty over the outcome of the Ukraine war and Donald Trump’s tariff policies. In a sign of the importance Merz attaches to foreign policy, he was willing to make concessions to his partner, the center-left Social Democrats (SPD), in the allocation of other ministries in exchange for securing for his party the foreign ministry, which in Germany has traditionally gone to the government’s junior partner.
Merz also plans to create a national security council that would tie Germany’s foreign policy closer to the work of the chancellor. The choice of Johann Wadephul, a personal friend, to head the council is part of this effort to centralize foreign policymaking.
The war in Gaza has long been a sensitive topic in Germany, given the country’s Nazi past. On May 26, Merz noted that the suffering of Gaza’s civilian population could no longer be justified by the fight against Hamas. Until then, neither the chancellor nor Wadephul had criticized Israel for its conduct of the war, which has left more than 53,000 Palestinians dead since Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, killing 1200 people and taking 251 people hostage. Merz announced in February [MM1] that he would find a way to invite Benjamin Netanyahu to Germany despite an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for Israeli prime minister for complicity in crimes against humanity and war crimes. For his part, Wadephul has said that he sees as one of Germany’s tasks “to ensure that excessive and unjustified criticism of Israel is avoided,” such as “many resolutions in UN bodies that are one-sided against Israel.”
Under Merz, Germany is likely to remain one of the European states blocking a suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement over the Gaza war. The proposal to review the agreement was initiated by Ireland and Spain 15 months ago, only to gain traction in May, when the Netherlands added its voice to the demand and the situation in Gaza further deteriorated. On May 20, 17 of the EU’s 27 foreign ministers voted to review the deal, which has a human rights clause. A review can be approved by a simple majority, but a suspension would require support from the European Commission and unanimity among EU members A core group of countries including Germany, Italy, Hungary, Greece, and the Czech Republic remain opposed to a review.
The official German position is that Israel’s operations in Gaza raise serious questions but channels with the Israeli government need to remain open. Berlin did not sign a recent joint letter by the United Kingdom, France, and Canada threatening Israel with “concrete actions” if it proceeds with its offensive in Gaza.
Germany’s weapons export policy towards Israel is also unlikely to change. Last October, while still the leader of the opposition, Merz was very critical of the then SPD-led government for a brief pause in the approval of export licenses for arms.
Over the past five years, Germany has been the second largest exporter of weapons to Israel after the U.S. In 2024, Berlin approved exports worth €160 million ($166 million) including engines for Israeli Merkava tanks. This policy goes against German popular opinion. According to a poll in October 2024, 60 percent oppose German weapons sales to Israel with only 31 percent in favor.
The coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and the SPD also promises a more hawkish approach to Iran, by including the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) on the EU’s list of terrorist groups. This stance has been motivated by Iran’s human rights violations and hostage-taking policies, as well as its material support for Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Germany, like its E3 partners the United Kingdom and France, is being sidelined in ongoing negotiations between the U.S. and Iran over Tehran’s nuclear program. The EU, and more specifically the E3, were key in the run-up to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) but were unable to compensate Iran after Trump unilaterally quit the deal in May 2018.
Sebastian Sons, a Senior Researcher at the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO) in Bonn, told this author that “Germany will not play a very substantial role in these negotiations due to the fact that Trump wants do to it on his own.” At the same time, Sons notes that Germany will support any deal emerging from U.S.-Iran talks.
The E3 countries might still have an important role to play. In the event of a failure in negotiations between Washington and Tehran, France or the UK could initiate the so-called snapback mechanism to re-impose sanctions on Iran at the UN Security Council.
Overall, Germany’s policy towards the Middle East and North Africa region, like that of the EU and most European countries, will likely be more reactive than proactive. In both Berlin and Brussels, the focus remains the Ukraine war and containing irregular migration to Europe in the hope of reducing popular support for the European far-right. In April 2024, the European Parliament approved a harshening of Europe’s asylum and migration policies (which was severely criticized by human rights organizations) that will enter into force in 2026.
The new measures failed to prevent record results for radical right parties in the June 2024 elections to the European Parliament. Similarly, the focus of the CDU/CSU on migration politics during the German election campaign accompanied a steep rise of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in the polls. Long stuck below the 20 percent mark, the AfD took 21 percent of the vote in the last elections and is now polling close to 25 percent despite the new government’s policy of turning back asylum-seekers at Germany’s borders.
Germany and the EU’s concentration on Ukraine and migration control could easily be observed in their restrained response to Turkey’s arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu, the Istanbul mayor and chief opponent of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Ankara plays a key mediating role between Russia and Ukraine and fields the second largest conventional NATO army.
Turkey also occupies a key geographical position on Europe’s migration routes and has simply become too powerful to antagonize. Merz recently talked about Turkey as an “extremely valuable, important NATO partner.”
Concerning Germany’s relations with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Sons explains that the new government might forge closer ties with them. “The CDU has a more pragmatic position on the Gulf monarchies compared to, for instance, the Green Party [who fielded the previous foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock], when it comes to security cooperation or weapons sales,” the CARPO researcher said.
Another area where change might be in the offing is Germany’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) for the region. After decreasing ODA from $38 billion in 2023 to $33 billion in 2024, new cuts seem likely. While rumors about a possible merger of the foreign and development ministries have not materialized, the coalition agreement identifies foreign aid as a sector where the government can implement savings.
The new development minister, Reem Alabali-Radovan, has already announced that Germany’s international aid will show “more focus.” In 2023, Germany was the second largest donor to UNCHR and UNICEF. Berlin’s contributions have become more important due to the massive aid cuts by the U.S. and UK. Moving forward, Sons believes that for the German government the link between development aid and economic development “will become even more relevant,” with projects “more closely aligned with the economic interests of Germany.”
During the election campaign, members of both the AfD and the CDU/CSU demanded the return of Syrian refugees to their home country after the fall of Bashar al-Assad despite prevailing insecurity in the country. In recent months, and partly due to the massacres of Alawites in Latakia in March 2025, the debate has somewhat calmed down. The official policy of the new German government is to support “the stabilization and economic reconstruction of the country while tying this to clear conditions.” This conditionality, a recent interview with Wadephul suggests, is closely connected to the protection of minorities and the fight against terrorism. Around one million Syrian refugees are living in Germany. This population, argues Sons, provides Berlin with a “strategic advantage” in shaping the future of Syria that Berlin should not neglect.