On January 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a treaty forming a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” between Moscow and Tehran. This document became a major strategic document signed between the two countries since 2001. In the 24 years since that agreement, the global geopolitical environment has undergone vast changes. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it overnight became the world’s most sanctioned nation, and its ties with the West—booming in 2001—were de-facto severed.
Though Russia’s break with the West began far earlier than 2022, the post-Ukraine invasion environment dramatically changed the Kremlin’s foreign relations. Growing international isolation prompted Russia to put an emphasis on strengthening ties with other undemocratic regimes, resulting in the signing of strategic treaties with North Korea and Belarus in 2024. However, the Russo-Iranian treaty is fundamentally different from those agreements: its remit goes beyond the narrow realm of defense and security, instead focusing on trade, sanctions evasion, and broader geopolitical questions.
While the Treaty is quite long—consisting of the preamble and 47 separate clauses—two fundamental themes should be highlighted.
First, defence and security. Unlike in Russia’s treaties with North Korea and Belarus, military cooperation is not the dominant theme in the document. However, this does not mean that cooperation in this sector is excluded from the scope of the Treaty. On the contrary, approximately one-third of the document discusses various aspects of Russo-Iranian coordination in defense and security. Yet one aspect drastically weakens the level of strategic commitment of both parties in this realm. Specifically, the document conspicuously does not oblige either party to commit militarily to defend the other in case of an armed conflict—a guarantee of collective security, as NATO has with its Article 5 and the Russian-dominated CSTO has with its Article 4. Instead, according to Clause 3 of the agreement, in case of an armed conflict with a third party, Russia and Iran must abstain from “rendering any military or any other support to the aggressor.” This aspect of the treaty de-facto reiterates a security-related provision of the previous 2001 Russo-Iranian agreement.
Interestingly, even before the treaty was signed, both Russian and foreign experts argued that Iran and Russia were unlikely to significantly expand their defense and security ties. Russia’s dependence on Iranian military-technical support in its war against Ukraine is likely to decrease as it begins to build Iranian-style drones in domestic factories. Instead, one important dimension where the Kremlin would certainly welcome Iran`s input is manpower. Yet Tehran is unlikely to commit troops to the war, given its generally cautious position about overt foreign military activity, its fear of Western retaliation, and—in particular—the brief and catastrophic experience of North Korean soldiers on the front line of the fight in Kursk, which abruptly ended after Pyongyang’s troops sustained a 40 percent casualty rate. In return for its reticence, Tehran is unlikely to secure access to modern Russian military equipment, which is much needed by Moscow on the front lines.
Furthermore, Iranian officials, such as the country’s Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali, made it very clear that Iran was not planning to join any military blocks. Instead, both parties agreed to “strengthen peace and security in the Caspian Sea region, Central Asia, South Caucasus and the Middle East” in order to “prevent destabilizing interference of third parties” in these regions (Clause 12). This could be construed as a clause aimed at both Western powers and regional actors such as Turkey. But the language is vague enough that very little is actually promised.
The second major part of the Russo-Iranian treaty concerns geopolitics and economics. Currently, two main factors serve as a foundation of the Russo-Iranian partnership: strategic dependency on export and transportation of hydrocarbons, and the pressure of acute economic sanctions imposed on both countries by the West. Therefore, the economic component—and, above all, the strengthening of sanctions-evading mechanisms—dominates the treaty. Putin clearly articulated this point in his remarks during the signing ceremony: “The essence of the Treaty boils down to creating additional conditions […] for the development of trade and economic ties. We need less bureaucracy and more actions.” Thus, in order to deal with these two critical challenges, the Treaty is likely to result in deepening of bilateral ties in two main areas.
First, the countries will likely make an emphasis on the development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200-kilometer-long ship, rail, and road route for moving freight between India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Central Asia as a means to avoid Western sanctions and expand Russia’s economic presence in Asia. For this purpose, using Iran as Russia’s “window to Asia” may seem to be the best, among existing, options for Moscow. Furthermore, Russia could use Iran’s advancements in certain types of technologies—akin to Tehran’s assistance in helping Russia develop drones during the war—in areas such as gas turbines that are essential for Russia`s oil- and natural gas-producing industries. In terms of bilateral trade, whose scope remains very meager ($4 billion in 2024), certain further steps could be expected as well. For instance, the two countries have virtually fully switched to trade in their national currencies and have both joined the Free Trade Zone between the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran, to start working in 2025. Moreover, Russia’s card payment system MIR, intended as an alternative to Western payment processing systems from which Iran is cut off, will become effective in Iran in the summer of 2025. These steps should each boost bilateral trade to some extent. Beyond any doubt, however, the most crucial aspect in bilateral economic ties is a natural gas-related “mega-contract” that will go beyond economic ties between two countries, but is likely to engage countries of Central Asia and South Caucasus, spreading its effect much further.
In theory, Russia and Iran—two pariah states with weak economies and heavy sanctions—should make a very good case of collaboration between the friends in need. The question, however, is whether theory and practice would come together in the case of the treaty between the two countries. The evidence for this is uncertain at best. As noted by Nikolay Meshkhedov (a Russian commentator specializing in ties between the two countries), “Russia, as a political player, is viewed [in Iran] with a great deal of incredulity […] The so-called ‘pro-Russian lobby,’ which does exist among certain groups in the Iranian political landscape, are the people who merely do not like Moscow to a lesser extent.” In effect, the seemingly idyllic relationship between Moscow and Tehran is an optical illusion: there are in fact many tensions underneath the appearance of calm that might contribute to the weakening of the partnership.
One of these issues abruptly came to a head at the end of 2024 after the sudden and shocking fall from power of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. For Russia, the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in Syria constitutes a lesser major geopolitical or economic predicament than it does to Iran. Syria is not a close neighbor of Russia; Putin’s intervention in the country to save Assad during the worst days of the war was largely a matter of convenience and prestige rather than a pressing need. Syria primarily mattered to Russia due to its strategic geographic location indispensable for Moscow`s attempt to expand its presence in resource-endowed Africa. To the extent that the Kremlin is hurt by the collapse of Assad’s regime, it is likely a nuisance related to Russia’s shrinking ability to use the country as a logistical hub on the way to Africa, where Russia’s true economic priorities lie. For Iran, on the other hand, the loss of Syria will result in major economic losses—given how closely the Iranian government was tied into the Syrian elite’s various businesses—and the forfeiture of Tehran’s strategic depth in the region. Indeed, with Syria gone, Iran will be hard-pressed to aid Hezbollah in Lebanon, already reeling from the devastation inflicted on it by Israel.
The developments in Syria have already showcased the growing dissatisfaction of some top-level Iranian military officials with Russia. For instance, in a leaked recording, IRGC General Behrouz Esbati claimed that Iran had asked the Kremlin for 1,000 Kalashnikov rifles to secure a critical frontline against rebel advances, but that request was denied. Inexplicably, Russia also reportedly refused entry to an Iranian plane carrying weapons to Syria. Additionally, Esbati lamented Russia’s airstrike-focused strategy in Syria, saying that instead of targeting key concentrations of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham advancing fighters, Russia’s raids primarily hit deserts—achieving nothing—and residential areas, killing civilians and whipping up popular support against Assad and Iran.
More worryingly for Russia, a part of Iran’s ruling elite, particularly within the so-called technocratic circles, is reportedly actively trying to convince President Pezeshkian to find a formula that would bring Iran closer to the United States—or at least would contribute to addressing the most acute bilateral issues between Tehran and Washington. Indeed, while in Iran supreme power does not lie with the office of the country’s president but rather with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, even he might allow for measured changes to Iran’s anti-Western position under certain circumstances. In turn, this could affect the current state of the Russo-Iranian partnership.
Strategic agreement between Russia and Iran has arguably become the most important milestone in bilateral ties between the countries over the span of the last two decades. However, success of the partnership is by no means predetermined, and depends on a variety of factors. Ultimately, while Russia’s benefits and interests in strengthening ties with Iran are quite clear, Iran’s gains might turn out to be much more limited. Furthermore, changes in the two countries’ relations with the United States, as well as the West in general, could also affect the partnership. If the prospect of realignment with the West is on the horizon, there is no doubt that Russia will sacrifice its ties with Iran. For strategists in Tehran, there is little incentive not to consider the same.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.