Editor’s Note: Mehran Haghirian closely monitors Iran’s relations with its Arab neighbors across the Persian Gulf. He is a frequent contributor to Stimson.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
When the Gaza war erupted a year ago, a major question faced the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Would they draw closer to the United States and by extension, Israel, in confrontation with Iran, the sponsor of Hamas, Hezbollah and other anti-Israel militant groups? Or would they chart a more independent course, increasingly diverging from the U.S.-Israeli vision of a new Middle Eastern order?
While Washington and Tel Aviv often present their partnerships with the Gulf as a success, the reality is more complex. Since 2021—and particularly after the March 2023 reconciliation agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia—the GCC states have increasingly prioritized diplomacy over confrontation, engagement over isolation, and regional dialogue over military escalation.
This is a major shift from the time of the Donald Trump administration, when Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates openly supported the U.S. “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, hoping to contain Tehran’s influence through U.S. and Israeli security guarantees. The approach began to change after Trump withdrew in 2018 from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and military tensions soared in the 2018-2020 period. Saudi Arabia and the UAE faced direct attacks to their energy infrastructure by Iran-backed groups.
Today, all six GCC members are engaged in direct and multilateral discussions with Tehran. In the latest example, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Riyadh on Oct. 9 and met with Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, before continuing to Doha, Qatar.
These diplomatic interactions have been critical in preventing the Gaza conflict from expanding into an even fiercer and broader regional war. The Gulf states recognize that their ambitious national development plans cannot succeed in a region embroiled in constant military conflict, especially one involving Iran.
Diplomatic engagements between Iran and the GCC have steadily expanded. At an emergency summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) following the outbreak of the Gaza war, for example, former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi was invited to Saudi Arabia by the Saudi crown prince. This marked the first high-level bilateral meeting between the two countries in over a decade. After Iran attacked Israel with missile and drone strikes in April 2024, in retaliation for the Israeli bombardment of an Iranian consulate in Damascus, the Gulf states doubled down on their engagement with Tehran. Warm exchanges following Raisi’s death in a helicopter crash in May, and the high-level attendance at his funeral by GCC leaders, underscored the trend toward rapprochement.
This diplomatic momentum continued when Masoud Pezeshkian succeeded Raisi after winning presidential elections in June. GCC leaders congratulated him and sent high-level delegations to his inauguration. When Araghchi became Iran’s new foreign minister, his GCC counterparts quickly reached out and met with him on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.
The engagements took a multilateral turn in Qatar on Oct. 3, when GCC foreign ministers held an informal joint meeting with their Iranian counterpart, the first of its kind. The discussions were a collective effort to manage the escalating tensions between Iran and Israel, with the GCC states reassuring Tehran of their neutrality in the conflict. They also addressed Iranian concerns about U.S.-Israel-GCC air defense partnerships and the use of Arab airspace for missile overflights.
For the Gulf states, the last year has underscored that their interests are likely to be sidelined in favor of Israel. Washington’s inability so far to end the escalating war in Gaza and Lebanon has only reinforced this view. As a result, they have doubled down on their strategies of de-escalation and regional diplomacy.
The Abraham Accords, once hailed as a breakthrough in Israeli-Gulf relations, now appear stalled. Only two GCC states—Bahrain and the UAE—signed the accords, and progress with Saudi Arabia remains contingent on a concrete path toward the establishment of a Palestinian state. Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman also reject advancing relations with Israel while the Palestinian issue is no closer to resolution.
Qatar’s emir, speaking at an Asia Cooperation Dialogue meeting earlier this month, was unequivocal: “It has become crystal clear that what is happening [in Gaza] is genocide.” Oman’s Foreign Minister, Badr Al Busaidi, echoed this sentiment, stating, “It is only by ending Israel’s illegal occupation of Palestine that we can hope to restore peace to the region.” He went further, adding, “Anyone who believes we can achieve peace by other means—by containing Iran, by eliminating Hamas, by defeating Hezbollah, or by steadfast political, military, and financial support for Israel—is either deluded, naive, or deliberately avoiding the truth.”
The Biden administration’s attempts to link a U.S.-Saudi defense pact to Riyadh’s normalization with Israel have also faltered. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan made it clear that “Palestinian statehood is a prerequisite for peace, rather than its byproduct.” This was in stark contrast to U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s suggestion that “you can’t disentangle one piece from the others,” referring to defense agreements without normalization with Israel.
A full-scale Iran-Israel military confrontation is the worst possible scenario for the GCC. Such a conflict could have devastating consequences for the region’s energy infrastructure, the backbone of Gulf economies. The 2019 Houthi missile and drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities and UAE infrastructure were a stark reminder of these vulnerabilities. Even if the Gulf states are not directly targeted, the ripple effects from a broader conflict could disrupt energy markets, destabilize the global economy, and derail the region’s long-term development goals.
Iran’s missile and drone attacks on Israel in April and October have intensified concerns in the Gulf. Iran’s ballistic missile program has long been a source of anxiety for the GCC states, and these recent exchanges have only heightened those fears. Another looming concern is the possibility of Iran developing a nuclear weapon. With Hezbollah and Hamas weakened by Israeli strikes, Iran may turn to its nuclear program as a deterrence measure. Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with their own expanding nuclear programs, are closely watching the situation and the international community is aware of the real risk of regional nuclear proliferation.
The recent diplomatic meeting in Doha between GCC officials and Iran was a clear effort to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control. Qatar, long positioned as a mediator in regional conflicts, played a key role in persuading Tehran to delay retaliatory strikes following the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in July, in hopes of brokering a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Although those efforts failed, and Iran launched attacks in October, the GCC’s active engagement reflects its commitment to preventing further escalation.
The UAE has also maintained a delicate neutrality, preserving its economic relationships with both Iran and Israel while keeping diplomatic channels open. In many ways, the UAE has positioned itself as a potential mediator between them—a role that could enhance the Emirates’ geopolitical standing and as well as efforts to end the conflict.
While the GCC states may privately support Israel’s wars on Hamas and Hezbollah, they remain deeply concerned about the long-term consequences of these military campaigns. A prolonged U.S.-Iran or Israel-Iran confrontation could derail GCC economic ambitions for years. Already, the aviation and tourism sectors in the region are suffering from disruptions and rising costs.
The Gulf states are walking a tightrope between Washington, Tel Aviv, and Tehran, hoping to avert an all-out war while pursuing their vision for a prosperous and peaceful future. As Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal told Pezeshkian in Doha: “We aim to permanently close the chapter on our differences and focus on resolving issues, developing relations as two friendly and brotherly countries.”
These new tones and approaches by GCC leaders suggest they have no desire to return to an era of conflict and tensions, no matter the outcome of U.S. presidential elections. The lesson of the past year is clear for the GCC: the future of the region lies in dialogue, not in war.
Mehran Haghirian is the Director of Regional Initiatives at the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation. He currently leads the Integrated Futures Initiative, a project dedicated to supporting economic diplomacy and economic development in the Persian Gulf.