Weekly Briefing: Remembrance of Mahsa Jina Amini and calls for change remain strong, as Pezeshkian’s cabinet disappoints

Contents:

• Remembrance of Mahsa Jina Amini and calls for change remain strong, as Pezeshkian’s cabinet disappoints
• After 10 years of conflict, Yemen’s civil war drags on with little optimism for an end
• The human toll of failed cease-fire diplomacy continues to rise
• As Gaza impact continues to ripple outward, Islamists secure gains in Jordan’s parliamentary elections
• Pakistan’s patience with Taliban-run Afghanistan wearing thin
• Iranian missile shipments to Russia raise security concerns in US, Europe

Remembrance of Mahsa Jina Amini and calls for change remain strong, as Pezeshkian’s cabinet disappoints

Shukriya Bradost
Non-resident Scholar

• Two years on since the Sept. 16, 2022, killing of Mahsa Amini in police custody and the start of the Woman, Life, Freedom protests, popular demands for social reforms will continue to shape the future of Iran, despite the window-dressing of Pezeshkian’s pseudo-progressive government. 

• However, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who remains Iran’s ultimate authority, is unlikely to approve any domestic reforms that could threaten his religious kingdom.

The “credibility and sincerity” of newly elected Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s National Unity government must be measured by the country’s “recognition of equal rights for all citizens,” according to reformist Zahra Rahnavard, who has been under unofficial house arrest since her husband’s support of anti-government protests in the 2009 Green Movement. 

The National Unity government is expected to adjust Iran’s domestic and foreign policies to help the Islamic Republic regime navigate internal and external challenges. The need for reforms became especially apparent after the Woman, Life, Freedom movement exploded on Sept. 16, 2022, in response to the death of Mahsa Jina Amini in police custody. These months of protests, spread across the country, challenged the regime’s survival and highlighted decades of discrimination against women and ethnic minorities, particularly the Kurds and Baluchis. Although, by spring 2023, the authorities significantly suppressed the movement through mass arrests, retaliations, and violent crackdowns, protests have since continued, but on a smaller scale and more sporadically. Pezeshkian notably acknowledged social and justice issues during his campaign and promised reforms; yet hopes for meaningful change were dashed from the start. An alarming number of executions have taken place in the past three months, with many Iranian women beaten to death by the morality police or sentenced to death on false charges. In August 2024 alone, just one month after the snap presidential election, at least 106 Iranians were hanged — an average of one execution every seven hours. 

There are four women in Pezeshkian’s cabinet, including a minister, two vice presidents, and a government spokesperson, marking the highest representation of women in the Iranian government since the 1979 revolution. However, according to informed sources, these women were appointed “with the condition that they wear a veil and be married, suggesting the government’s response to the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising is a superficial and misleading attempt to disguise a small concession as significant progress. 

Moreover, Pezeshkian’s cabinet, whose members have an average age of 59.8 years, is the oldest in the regime’s history. Contrary to his promises, not only is the youth constituency under-represented, but the 19-member cabinet lacks meaningful minority representation, a fact that has drawn criticism from Iran’s Kurdish and Baluchi communities. Although, for the first time in the history of the Islamic regime, a Sunni Kurd was appointed as a vice president, this token gesture underscores the decades of systemic discrimination against these groups. 

The disconnect between the government’s promises and the realities faced by its citizens was made evident by a recent survey conducted by the Ministry of Culture, which revealed widespread “discontent” among the population. Over 90% of Iranians are “dissatisfied” with the country’s current state and believe the future is “beyond repair.” Respondents identified women’s rights, and specifically the removal of the mandatory hijab, as among the most pressing issues. These finding indicate that the cries of the peaceful Woman, Life, Freedom uprising will continue to shape the future, despite the window-dressing of Pezeshkian’s pseudo-progressive government. 

In reality, the trajectory of Pezeshkian’s term depends on the political decisions of the 85-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who remains the ultimate authority in Iran and is unlikely to approve any domestic reforms that could trigger a domino effect leading to the collapse of his religious kingdom. Meanwhile, the so-called national unity government will function more as an apologist, spectator, and facilitator of the regime’s diplomatic façade, rather than a means of uniting the country in progress toward achieving basic human rights for all its citizens.

After 10 years of conflict, Yemen’s civil war drags on with little optimism for an end

Gerald M. Feierstein
Director, Arabian Peninsula Affairs Program, and Distinguished Sr. Fellow on U.S. Diplomacy

• A cease-fire agreement now in its 30th month has removed the Saudi-led coalition from an active role in the conflict and reduced fighting between the Houthis and their domestic adversaries, but it has not stabilized Yemen’s dire economic conditions or improved the equally dire humanitarian situation.

• While the degree to which the Houthi campaign against international shipping in the Red Sea and Israel in the name of defending Palestinians has achieved its desired domestic and regional results is questionable, it has undoubtedly set back efforts to end the civil conflict.

In September 2014, the Houthis, with support from military units loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, launched an assault on the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, and deposed the transitional government of Abed Rabo Mansour Hadi. They claimed their attack was a strike at a corrupt ruling elite and a protest over rising fuel prices. A more probable explanation, however, was that the Houthis and Saleh recognized that the transitional framework agreement signed by Yemen’s political parties in 2011 was nearing its conclusion. Once concluded, Yemenis would go to the polls to approve constitutional reforms and elect a new government for the first time since 2007, permanently blocking the Houthis and Saleh from achieving their goal of seizing power.

Despite sustained mediation efforts by the United Nations and seven years of a Saudi-led military intervention intended to force the Houthis to negotiate a political end to their campaign, the lines of control between the Houthi-dominated north and west of the country and the south and east under the control of the internationally recognized government and its partners have remained static. A cease-fire agreement now in its 30th month has removed the Saudi-led coalition from an active role in the conflict and has reduced but not eliminated fighting between the Houthis and their domestic adversaries. The relative calm has reduced casualties, but it has not stabilized Yemen’s dire economic conditions or improved the equally dire humanitarian situation, which continues to rank among the world’s worst. Yemeni suffering continues unabated, exacerbated in areas under Houthi control by a reign of terror, including the arrest of dozens of international humanitarian aid workers, former US Embassy staff, and others. The campaign may reflect Houthi fears of growing popular opposition to their rule. Sana’a had witnessed a rise in anti-Houthi demonstrations in the weeks before Oct. 7.

The Oct. 7 Hamas terror attack in Israel and the Israeli military response has provided the Houthis with an opportunity to reverse their declining popular support and appeal to Yemen’s pro-Palestinian majority as well as burnish their regional reputation by aggressively attacking international shipping in the Red Sea and launching numerous drone and missile strikes aimed at Israel in the name of defending Palestinians. While the degree to which the Houthi campaign has achieved its desired domestic and regional results is questionable, it has undoubtedly set back efforts to end the civil conflict. Saudi negotiations with the Houthis, which had been reportedly close to an agreement to permanently end the coalition’s military engagement and potentially lead to direct intra-Yemeni talks, have been frozen since the onset of the Houthi Red Sea campaign. UN efforts have been similarly stymied by Houthi operations as well as Houthi arrests of UN and other staff.

Ten years after the Houthis marched into Sana’a, their ultimate objective remains unarticulated. Whether they seek to rule all of Yemen or will be satisfied with control over the territory that made up pre-1990 North Yemen consistent with the former Zaydi Imamate is an open question. Should the Houthis agree to sit down at the negotiating table, they will be compelled to answer that question. But, in the meantime, the civil war drags on with no clear driver to bring it to an end.

The human toll of failed cease-fire diplomacy continues to rise

Brian Katulis
Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy

• The Biden administration has gained little traction after months of diplomacy on a cease-fire and hostage release, raising questions about its overall strategy for the war.

• As the first anniversary of the start of the Israel-Hamas war approaches, there are few signs for hope in the quiet diplomatic efforts.

News of more death and destruction in Gaza along with continued massive protests inside of Israel calling for a cease-fire and hostage release this past week provided vivid reminders of the rising human toll of failed cease-fire diplomacy.

More than three and a half months after US President Joe Biden publicly issued a cease-fire and hostage release plan followed by several rounds of intense diplomacy that have involved Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Burns, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and other top White House officials, a deal remains elusive. Efforts are still ongoing, with Secretary Blinken arriving in Cairo today on his 10th trip to the Middle East since the Israel-Hamas war began.

The main reason why a deal has been so difficult to achieve is that the two main combatants, Israel and Hamas, are led by figures, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, who have not seen it in their interests to compromise.

Sinwar has reportedly calculated that more bloodshed and losses for Palestinians will help advance his movement’s interest. Hamas is still willing to use brute force and intimidation in order to impose its will on Palestinians in Gaza, even as they suffer devastating losses from Israel’s military campaign. Netanyahu continues to declare that a deal is not close, drawing the ire of many Israelis, including those who have served in government with him, for not doing enough to secure the release of hostages.

These dynamics raise important questions about the wisdom of the course that the Biden administration has charted in its diplomacy to pursue a cease-fire and hostage release. In essence, the Biden administration has stated for months that this cease-fire deal has been its top priority and was the key that would open the door to wider diplomatic discussions aimed at stabilizing the Middle East. Coming up short repeatedly should cause the Biden administration to reassess whether it is on the right path.

The Biden administration did not prioritize the Middle East in its governing agenda when it came into office in 2021. After Russia reinvaded Ukraine in 2022, causing global energy prices to rise, and as China was deepening its engagement in the Middle East, the Biden administration stepped up its involvement in the region, starting with President Biden’s visit to Israel and Saudi Arabia in 2022.

But the war in Gaza since Oct. 7 pushed the Biden administration into a reactive, crisis management mode; and even though it has prevented a wider regional war and taken measures to help Israel defend itself, its diplomacy has been less successful in producing the outcomes it had hoped for, including on a Gaza cease-fire and hostage release deal.

With a little more than four months left in his administration, President Biden and his team should reflect on why they have fallen so short in achieving their goals and determine what they might do differently on Middle East policy in the next few months. There are many lessons to be learned from these diplomatic efforts that will be useful for the future and the next US administration.

Follow: @Katulis

As Gaza impact continues to ripple outward, Islamists secure gains in Jordan’s parliamentary elections

Dima M. Toukan
Non-Resident Scholar

• The Islamic Action Front surged in Jordan’s Sept. 10 parliamentary elections, gaining about a fifth of the seats and winning five times as many votes as the next party.

• Touted as an important step in Jordan’s gradual process of political modernization, the election was meant to signal normalcy and stability amid regional turmoil; but turnout was weak, and the winning parties will have limited leeway to deliver on their election pledges.

On Sept. 10, Jordanians voted in the first parliamentary elections held under a new electoral law that was passed in 2022. The new law is a key piece of Jordan’s ambitious political modernization plan that aims to energize political parties and promote the active participation of youth and women in public life. Under the new system Jordanians voted for both partisan and local lists. Of the 138-seat parliament, 97 seats were contested through local lists covering 18 electoral districts, and 41 were allocated for political parties that competed on a national level.

The new electoral system is meant to influence voting behavior, which so far has been tribally driven, but the election results have confirmed the continued dominance of tribal and pro-government groups. The new law does not wholly address the electoral system’s structural issue of unequal representation (the ratio of voters per seat), nor does it remedy parliament’s limited mandate. Jordan’s carefully crafted electoral system still favors provincial tribal regions over the main cities where two-thirds of Jordanians live, while under the constitution most powers remain with the king.

Touted as an important step in Jordan’s gradual process of political modernization, this year’s election was meant to signal normalcy and stability amid regional turmoil. The fatal attack by a Jordanian East Banker on three Israelis just two days before the election highlighted this façade’s thin veneer as well as the widespread popular anger with Israeli aggression. As Jordan continues to grapple with the impact of the war on Gaza, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the local political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, surged in the election, gaining about a fifth of the seats and winning five times as many votes as the next party. Already well organized, grassroots connected, and tactically adept, the IAF’s support for the Palestinian cause allowed it to expand its influence beyond its traditional constituency. The movement itself read this victory as a “popular referendum” on the party’s support for the cause and its demand to revoke the 1994 peace treaty with Israel.

Turnout was 32.25%, slightly higher than in 2020 (29.9%), a COVID-19 year, but lower than 2016 (36%). Similar to other elections, turnout was higher in tribal areas and lowest in the capital, Amman. For an election heralded as part of a new era of political transformation, turnout was disappointing. Election cycles delivering little change have effectively driven a wedge between parliament and the electorate, with 87% of Jordanians saying in a survey earlier this year that they do not think the outgoing parliament has had any accomplishments in the last 12 months and 66% that they have little or no confidence in parliament. An anemic economy, already struggling to create enough jobs to absorb the bulging youth population, further weakened by the war on Gaza has exacerbated political apathy and depressed turnout.

The revamped election law provides that only political parties that secure at least 2.5% of the vote make it through to parliament. Effectively, this helped weed out most of the 36 competing parties that did not make the cut and is expected to increase the likelihood of party mergers in future elections. Other than the IAF, political parties that participated in the election have shown themselves to be weakly institutionalized with poorly articulated or outdated platforms. Ideologically, several political parties shared similar platforms, fracturing their political power into artificially competing groups with fickle bases of support.

Despite its political strength, the IAF’s electoral win will not change the rules of the game. Winning parties will have limited leeway to deliver on their election pledges and influence policy making. Managing the electorate’s expectations will be critical to ensure Jordanians understand the limits of this gradualist approach, lest they become further disillusioned by the dragging pace of the democratic process.

Follow: @DimaToukan

Pakistan’s patience with Taliban-run Afghanistan wearing thin

Marvin G. Weinbaum
Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies

• Amid deepening bilateral mistrust, fighting erupted between Pakistani and Afghan border guards last week, with both countries accusing each other of firing the first shot.

• Behind the rising border tensions is the major source of enmity between the two neighbors: the Taliban regime’s harboring of the anti-Pakistan terrorist group Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.

Cross-border skirmishes have become a familiar feature of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Deepening distrust may be driving the two neighbors toward a more serious conflict, turning the already volatile region into a new war zone. Just last week, fighting erupted between Pakistani and Afghan border guards, with both countries accusing each other of firing the first shot. The Taliban claimed that Pakistani troops attacked their security personnel as they attempted to erect a security outpost on the Afghan side of the disputed Durand Line border. Pakistan, in turn, accused the Taliban of launching an attack on its military checkpoints, aimed at seizing territory. This latest exchange of fire, which claimed lives on both sides, results from the approach both countries have taken over their disputed, colonial-era demarcated 2,640-kilometer border.

Behind the rising border tensions is the major source of enmity between the two countries: the Taliban regime’s harboring of the anti-Pakistan terrorist group Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP, which is often accused of acting as an Afghan Taliban proxy, has carried out an increasing numbers of terrorist attacks in the Pakistani provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan. From July to August, the number of attacks rose from 38 to 59. As seen by Pakistan, the territorial and terrorist threats are intertwined, with Kabul’s broad objective being to use the TTP to gain control of Pakistan’s tribal areas and incorporate them into Afghanistan’s Islamic Emirate.

Pakistan has for some time relied almost entirely on hard power to thwart its terrorist challenge. Cross-border air strikes have been launched on TTP bases located inside Afghanistan, but most of Pakistan’s efforts to stymie terrorism have taken the form of Army ground operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Meanwhile, the Kabul regime has adopted a more aggressive stance toward Pakistan. In a show of strategic deterrence and readiness for conflict, the Afghan Taliban has enlisted new military units, moved heavy artillery and tanks toward the border, and started constructing new military posts close to Pakistan’s now-completed despised border fencing. To bolster its air defenses, Afghanistan is also seeking Russian equipment.

Peace talks initiated by the Kabul government between the TTP and Pakistan’s military broke down two years ago over irreconcilably different demands. Any dialogue with the TTP is currently seen by the Pakistan Army as signaling weakness that only emboldens terrorists. Of late, the tough approach to the TTP has also been caught up in domestic politics. Residents of the KPK province, which encompasses the tribal areas, have long been critical of the Army’s often heavy-handed counterterrorism efforts, and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government in KPK has championed their cause. Its provincial assembly recently passed a controversial resolution calling for the court-martialing of military officers accused of abusing their power and interfering in civilian affairs. This action was followed by an announcement from the outspoken KPK Chief Minister Ali Amin Khan Gandapur that he was engaging in peace talks with the Afghan Taliban without federal government participation, an initiative subsequently endorsed by jailed PTI leader Imran Khan.

Quite naturally, Gandapur’s statement drew sharp criticism. The foreign office has called the KPK chief minister’s solo diplomatic foray not only a deviation from Pakistan’s foreign policy but a direct attack on the federal government’s authority. As an indication of how seriously Pakistan’s military leadership takes the affair, Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir quickly undertook a visit to the KPK, where he claimed the support of the province’s civilian law enforcement agencies, including the police, that are normally under the chief minister’s control. The military appears determined to make understood that it alone sets policy toward the TTP, and that it has every intention of continuing a hard line against both that group and the Afghan government. In the hope of eliminating terrorism originating in Afghanistan once and for all, a frustrated military also seems to be inching toward sharply intensifying operations against its western neighbor.

Research assistant Naad-e-Ali Sulehria contributed to this piece.

Follow: @mgweinbaum

Iranian missile shipments to Russia raise security concerns in US, Europe

Iulia-Sabina Joja
Director, Black Sea Program

• Iran’s shipment of 200 Fath-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia marks an important new line crossed by Iran, worsening its confrontation with the West and further bolstering Tehran’s relations with Moscow.

• Despite mounting intelligence and extended warnings, the West was unable to prevent Iran from following through with this sale.

Last week, the United States government confirmed earlier reporting that Iran has shipped short-range ballistic missiles to Russia for use in the latter’s war on Ukraine. The affirmative announcement came as no surprise, but this Iranian action in fact constitutes a significant escalation and will result in a further deterioration of Western — and particularly European — relations with Iran. The US had warned about Iranian deliveries of missiles to Russia since as early as fall 2022; and this past February, news reports suggested Iran had sent “around 400” road-mobile ballistic missiles that could hit targets 186-435 miles away. Now, according to the Pentagon, Iran has sent approximately 200 Fath-360 ballistic missiles with a range of up to 75 miles. The US Department of the Treasury has imposed sanctions on entities involved in the transfer. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany have, in turn, banned Iran Air flights, as the civilian national airliner was involved in transporting these weapons. The European Union, however, has yet to respond with its own sanctions on Iran.

Despite mounting intelligence and extended warnings, the West was unable to prevent Iran from following through with this sale. Though the details of the recent Fath-360 transfer remain unclear, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has confirmed that in exchange for the missiles, Russia is sharing advanced technology with Iran, including in the nuclear sphere. Iran has denied the shipment, just like it has continued to deny the delivery and production in Russia of thousands of kamikaze drones employed by the Russian Armed Forces against both Ukrainian military and civilian targets. Iran is focusing its policy southward in the Middle East but is increasingly engaged northward, in the Black Sea region, as well. At the same time, Tehran’s new president and foreign minister have been lobbying for sanctions relief and closer engagement with Europe. Those policies are inherently contradictory. With Iranian missiles soon to be employed on European soil, Tehran is forcing the West to double down on punitive measures.

This latest missile shipment marks an important new line crossed by Iran, worsening its confrontation with the West and further bolstering Tehran’s relations with Moscow (and Beijing). On the battlefield, the Fath-360 will help Russia keep the upper hand in in-close fighting along the frontlines. Politically, this shipment — the first documented case of proliferation of this class of Iranian weapons into Europe — puts Iran at the heart of European security concerns. It solidifies and expands Iran’s role as a major contributor to Russia’s war, along with China, which has recently also been found to be directly supporting Russia’s war machine, including, the UK has charged, by supplying lethal equipment. Coupled with the news over the past few weeks of election interference attempts in the West by Iran, China, and Russia, this positions Iran at the heart of an emerging axis of revisionist powers in direct confrontation with the West.

Follow: @IuliJo

Photo by Majid Saeedi/Getty Images