Editor’s note:
As BRICS member states and their outreach partners gather in Russia for their first summit since the group’s expansion, Brookings experts outline their expectations for the summit, how different countries view the grouping, and its potential impact on the international order.
BRICS: Not a threat, but a symptom of discontent
Asli Aydıntaşbaş
For years, Western policymakers have largely dismissed BRICS as more bark than bite. After all, the bloc long aimed to create an alternative to Western dominance in the global financial system—and failed. BRICS has not rewritten the rules of international trade, no common BRICS currency has materialized, and its alternative payment systems have yet to dent the U.S. dollar’s global dominance.
But it is not a good idea to take BRICS lightly—if nothing else, for the political symbolism surrounding the upcoming meeting in Kazan, Russia. Who would have thought that only two-and-a-half years after his brutal invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin would be hosting a summit attended by dozens, including U.S. partners like Egypt and NATO ally Turkey, which has recently expressed an interest in membership?
The fact that such a meeting is happening at all signals a shift in global politics and exasperation with the U.S. role in the world—and that should concern Washington. BRICS represents more than just the fragmentation of the international system—it embodies growing resentment among middle powers toward the U.S.-led world order. In the aftermath of the war in Gaza, Russia and China have more effectively harnessed this anti-Western sentiment, capitalizing on frustrations over Western double standards as well as the use of sanctions and economic coercion by the West. It doesn’t mean that middle powers want to trade U.S. dominance for Chinese—but it means they are open to aligning with Russia and China for a more fragmented and autonomous world.
On trade, BRICS has neither established its own trade regime nor institutions, but key trends hint at its growing influence. For example, China now has an alternative to the SWIFT payment system, though limited in use, and countries like Turkey and Brazil increasingly restructure their dollar reserves into gold. Currency swaps for energy deals are also a popular idea—all suggesting a desire for greater financial independence from the West.
Washington should not ignore BRICS. The United States should focus on revitalizing the Group of 20 and on offering meaningful partnerships to key middle powers like Turkey, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia. BRICS is not the cause but an indication of a global insurgency. And if unaddressed, these groupings will eventually coalesce around a more coherent political and economic agenda.
Southeast Asia and BRICS
Lynn Kuok
On June 18, Malaysia expressed an interest in joining BRICS, hours before the Chinese premier’s visit to the country. A week earlier, Thailand, at the “BRICS Dialogue with Developing Countries” held in Russia, announced its desire to join.
Indonesia has adopted a cautious stance, despite speculation about its potential membership. Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo attended the 15th BRICS Summit in South Africa in August 2023, but he stressed the need for careful evaluation, stating, “We do not want to make any hasty decision.” While Indonesia continues to ponder its membership in BRICS, it forged ahead with seeking membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in August 2023. Indonesia’s prioritization of the OECD is prompted by its desire to achieve “developed country” status by its 100th independence anniversary in 2045 to attract foreign direct investment and raise Indonesia’s profile. Some analysts argue that Indonesia’s bid for OECD membership is meant to signal that it is distancing itself from BRICS by joining the Western-centric group. But Indonesia is not choosing a side with this decision—it was recently reported to be holding its first-ever joint military drill with Russia in November.
In pursuing BRICS membership, Malaysia and Thailand are prompted by economic aspirations, but strategic factors factor in too. They seek to enhance their countries’ economic and strategic options, have a greater voice in world affairs, and increase their regional and international status. In Malaysia’s case, signaling displeasure with the United States and the broader Western handling of the Gaza issue also comes into play. Neither country, however, seeks to abandon ties with the West or undermine the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which Malaysia will chair next year.
If the goal of Southeast Asian countries in joining BRICS is to better hedge in a more multipolar world, they will have to manage any anti-Western rhetoric and dynamics, including their own, carefully. They would also do well to build bridging ties between BRICS and groupings such as the Group of Seven.
India’s BRICS balancing act
Tanvi Madan
As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi heads to Russia for the BRICS summit, many eyes in India will be focused not on that grouping, but on whether he has a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. While the two leaders have had a couple of pull–asides over the last two years, they have not had a bilateral meeting for five years. A meeting would indicate a thaw—or at least a renewed effort at one—in what has been an icy relationship since the countries’ 2020 border clash. India announced an agreement to resolve some of the border problems resulting from that crisis, laying the ground for such a meeting and, possibly, a broader stabilization effort.
Of Modi’s other bilaterals, the one with Putin to discuss India–Russia engagement and the Russia–Ukraine war will garner some attention (India’s continuing shuttle diplomacy included a meeting between Modi and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in New York a few weeks ago), as will an expected meeting with the Iranian president, given Middle East tensions. When it comes to the grouping more broadly, India will likely again use the platform to reiterate its preference for multipolarity and its disappointment at the lack of representativeness of several international institutions. While using BRICS to signal to its Western partners that it has other options, India will continue to describe its participation in the grouping as coming from a non-Western—rather than an anti–Western—position. New Delhi won’t want to see this grouping go the Non–Aligned Movement way—i.e., a grouping that was expanded and formalized in a way that India never wanted, and that forced New Delhi to take certain “bloc” positions that hindered India’s pursuit of its own interests.
Ensuring that the BRICS’ agenda does not get hijacked or dominated by those who might want it to be an anti-Western grouping—China, Russia, Iran—will be one task ahead for New Delhi. It will also have to adjust itself to an expanded BRICS. That expansion has ensured that India will stay involved in the grouping—to protect its own interests, and so as not to leave a vacuum for China to exploit. India will not want to see its role and influence diluted. Thus, it might form informal coalitions within BRICS with partners like–minded on specific issues (Brazil and the United Arab Emirates might fit this bill on several). Outside BRICS, it will continue to invest more in IBSA (India–Brazil–South Africa) and in independent engagement with the Global South countries.
At the summit, India will also try to block certain outcomes. India lost the initial battle for establishing membership criteria before the expansion, but it will now seek to ensure that a rival like Pakistan does not get admitted despite Sino–Russian support for it. While it has supported the use of national currencies for trade, it will likely impede any effort to make this binding (it has already distanced itself from efforts to target the dollar). It will also continue to try to prevent certain language in the joint statement, for instance, support for Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative or Global Development Initiative. Previous statements have not taken a consensus view on the Russia–Ukraine war, but one thing to watch is if India again signs onto language that is explicitly critical of Israel’s approach in the Gaza conflict (the foreign ministers’ statement in June did include language calling for the release of hostages, but did not mention the October 7 terrorist attack). And Iran’s presence as a new member will only make India’s balancing act on Middle East matters at the summit trickier.
Long on political theater, short of substantive deliverables
Douglas A. Rediker
As the BRICS summit approaches, expectations are high that the group is on its way to reshaping the global order. However, BRICS remains an organization whose members are brought together by a negative, not an affirmative, agenda. Its members share a dislike of the current U.S.-led world order, but beyond that, their political, economic, and strategic interests diverge so fundamentally that implementation of its ambitious agenda remains unlikely. The upcoming summit is likely to be long on political theater and short of substantive deliverables.
The recent expansion of BRICS membership has only amplified internal contradictions. Members include relatively wealthy, surplus economies and poorer deficit countries grappling with debt and financial challenges. Members include major energy producers and some of the world’s largest energy importers. Geopolitical rivalries percolate just below the surface, including between China, India, and Brazil, all of which are jockeying to play the role as the leader of the Global South.
What they do share is a willingness to challenge the U.S.-led world order and the dominance of the G7. That is insufficient for cohesive action. For example, the group’s ambitious goal of “de-dollarizing” the global financial system remains largely rhetorical. While bilateral trade involving the U.S. dollar has declined somewhat in the aftermath of the ramping up of U.S. sanctions, the dollar’s role as a reserve currency remains relatively stable. Replacing the U.S. dollar requires a credible alternative. While BRICS leaders have touted efforts to move away from the dollar, their sentiments have not been shared by their central bankers, whose job is to actually protect the wealth of the country and ensure financial stability. Last year, when Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, touted that Brazil would migrate away from the dollar and into the yuan, within months, the Brazilian central bank instead reduced its holdings of yuan and increased its dollar holdings.
Proposing a migration away from the dollar demands providing an alternative currency that serves the needs of countries involved in the global trading and international monetary systems. The dollar is entrenched because it is highly liquid, widely accepted, and perceived to be a consistent store of value. Creating an alternative would require a highly complex set of agreements between a large number of countries that would be forced to cede some degree of sovereignty over their own monetary policy. This is simply unrealistic for BRICS countries or others. Even the euro has struggled to supplant the dollar, in part because of Europe’s lack of fiscal union. Creating a common BRICS currency would pose exponentially greater hurdles.
Calls to create a new BRICS alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are also unrealistic. The IMF plays a role akin to a lender of last resort: it lends to countries at such high risk that others will not do so. That means countries funding the IMF put their funds at risk to support poorer countries that might not be able to repay. For a new BRICS IMF alternative to be established, wealthier BRICS countries would need to be willing to provide funding to a new institution that would immediately put those funds at high risk when lending to poorer ones. Such intra-BRICS generosity is unlikely. The IMF’s own experience demonstrates how countries’ stances on lending policies become more cautious as they migrate from debtor to creditor countries. Creating a new institution in which poorer countries expect accommodative terms from wealthier countries will inevitably lead to governance disputes and disappointments.
The expanded BRICS summit is likely to generate headlines, but the group seems poised to repeat a familiar pattern of grand statements unsupported by tangible follow-through. Meaningful change in the global order requires more than shared dissent—it demands a shared affirmative vision and a willingness to make real sacrifices for the benefit of other members to advance that shared vision. The BRICS nations have yet to demonstrate they are willing and able to do so.
Russia and the BRICS summit
Angela Stent
The Kazan summit has great symbolic and practical importance for the Putin regime. As the war in Ukraine grinds on and the West continues to sanction and shun Russia, the summit will demonstrate that, far from being isolated, Russia has important partners like India, China, and other major emerging powers. They are committed to remaining neutral in the Russia-Ukraine war and maximizing their own leverage from this conflict.
Putin views BRICS as a key component of his quest to create a new world order where the United States and its allies can no longer dictate the political and economic rules of the international system. He presents the expanding BRICS as an alternative to groups like the G7, part of his determination to create a multipolar world where Russia’s interests will be respected and Russia’s influence will grow.
Since BRICS was founded 15 years ago, Russia has been committed to making it a more coherent and influential organization. Despite the heterogeneity of its membership and the modest achievements of its institutions to date, it has endured and grown. It is unclear whether Russia will achieve one of its main goals for BRICS—the creation of an alternative international financial system that will replace the current Western-dominated one. Nevertheless, Putin understands that Russia will continue to benefit from the desire of what he calls the “world majority” countries to assert their interests independently from those of the West. BRICS represents an important vehicle for them to achieve this objective.
Countries don’t want to have to choose
Tara Varma
Following the group’s expansion last year in Johannesburg, South Africa, the BRICS bloc intends to deepen its cooperation. Russia’s foreign ministry announced the participation of 24 countries in the summit in Kazan in late October, including Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, and Egypt, the four countries that officially joined the BRICS at the beginning of this year. In its expanded format, BRICS+ represents 45% of the world population and 28% of global GDP. In comparison, the G7 represents 10% of the world population and 26% of global GDP.
Much to the dismay of its Western partners, Turkey signaled its interest in joining the grouping a few weeks ago—the first NATO member to do so. Turkey’s example is emblematic of the predicament Western powers are undergoing as they worry about the sustainability of the current world order. The rapprochement between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea has deadly implications for said order, and for the two conflicts taking place in Ukraine and the Middle East. China’s blatant support for Russia, in addition to North Korea’s, and Russia’s support for Iran tie these two conflicts in intractable ways.
That so many countries are willing to go to Russia, deemed a pariah state not so long ago for having violated international law by invading Ukraine, confirms a trend followed by an increasing number of countries in the world: they don’t want to have to choose between partners. India’s posture exemplifies this perfectly: it hasn’t given up on its relationship with Russia, all the while signaling its willingness for the war to end. Countries will opt for minilateral formats and will look at multiplying their options, whenever it suits them, despite or maybe precisely because of the heterogeneity of the grouping.
Efforts to reshape global governance could soon become a headache for Brazil
Valerie Wirtschafter
For over a decade, Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has championed BRICS as an avenue to reform multilateral institutions and reshape global governance while maintaining productive relations with the West. However, with rising geopolitical tensions between the United States and China, Russia’s war in Ukraine, conflict in the Middle East, and the expansion of the bloc to include more authoritarian countries with spotty human rights records, maintaining this position has become more challenging.
Lula is no stranger to navigating complicated political dynamics in pursuit of Brazil’s strategic interests. He has for years touted his record as a defender of democracy while boasting close relations with authoritarian leaders like Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela. Yet recently, that delicate dance has begun to unravel, as Lula’s government has grown critical of Maduro following a presidential election widely viewed as fraudulent. Since Lula questioned the election results, Maduro’s regime has accused him of changing during his time in prison and being a CIA agent.
Thus far, Lula has avoided grappling with the BRICS’ complexities and instead leveraged the coalition of seemingly strange bedfellows to strengthen cooperation. This balancing act may face another test if China becomes more demanding of Brazil internationally and when Russia takes the helm of the New Development Bank next year. Set up in 2014 by BRICS countries to foster infrastructure investments, the New Development Bank under Brazilian leadership has so far complied with international sanctions and put a hold on transactions involving Russia. In the not-too-distant future, Lula, a skilled fence sitter, may once again be forced to take a side.
Will North Korea join BRICS?
Andrew Yeo
As Russia gets ready to host its first BRICS+ summit and welcome new “plus” members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, one prospective member may be watching the summit closely. In recent months, North Korea has taken an interest in the BRICS. Last month, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui ditched the U.N. General Assembly meeting and joined the BRICS Women’s Forum in St. Petersburg instead. Her visit followed the North Korean vice-minister of sports’ attendance at a BRICS+ meeting held alongside the BRICS Games in June 2024. North Korean state media also praised BRICS’ expansion as a means of challenging the dollar as the global currency.
For North Korea, joining BRICS may offer diplomatic and economic benefits as Pyongyang aligns more closely with Moscow. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un recently acknowledged the development of a “new Cold War” and the “multi-polarization” of international economic relations. Kim may be looking to expand and diversify economic partnerships within a growing “anti-imperial” bloc.
Russia may have an interest in extending BRICS membership to North Korea. However, other members may resist adding a poor, pariah state to their ranks. North Korea provides geographic and perhaps geostrategic diversity to BRICS, but its inclusion offers little economic benefit. Its nuclear weapons program is also a reputational liability.
At this year’s BRICS summit, members will likely discuss deepening multilateralization. Who can join and how membership is determined will be interesting to see.