Maayan Dagan
The war that has consumed the Middle East for more than a year, drawing in Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran, was sparked by Hamas’s brutal—but non-traditional—terrorist attack of October 7, 2023. As these overlapping conflicts may be starting to wind down, it is worth taking stock of the valuable insights they provide into the nature of terrorism and its potential future developments.
What stand out most are the potential of cross-border attacks, the lower technological barriers to causing major damage, the escalatory risks arising from coordination among terrorist groups, and the power of psychological warfare to shape a conflict.
Securing the border
The inciting attack of October 7 was not a “typical” terrorist act; it was meticulously planned and executed as both an invasion and a declaration of war on Israel. While the attack included elements traditionally associated with terrorism—such as the mass murder of civilians, including women and children; heinous acts like rape; and the abduction of hostages, mostly civilians, taken to Gaza—it went far beyond the conventional scope of terrorism.
The attack underscored for Israel, and probably for other nations, the urgent need to reevaluate its approach to border security, as the threat of terror-attack-as-invasion has become a tangible reality. In the aftermath of October 7, there is a growing possibility that other terrorist organizations, or even some established armies, may attempt to replicate such operations, combining invasion tactics with acts of terror.
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Israel learned this lesson the hardest way. But other nations—particularly those with adversaries along their borders—should now consider preparing for similar scenarios to ensure the security of their borders and the safety of their civilian populations, thereby minimizing the risk of similar attacks. This includes actively protecting borders, even when an immediate threat is not expected. Israel’s experience has shown that technological measures alone are not always sufficient. In defending against terrorist organizations, the best approach is to prepare based on their capabilities rather than their often difficult-to-predict motivations. Also, we can expect a rise in investments in anti-missile armor, as capabilities such as Israel’s Iron Dome can play a crucial role in maintaining and protecting civilian lives.
Low-tech terror
Another important lesson learned from the tactics and capabilities used by Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and even Iran is that low-cost technology is now transforming the nature of armed conflicts around the world—from the Middle East to Ukraine. Tools such as drones and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as low-cost rockets and outdated and primitive missile launchers, are enhancing the precision and effectiveness of attacks, demonstrating that terrorist organizations do not require advanced, high-tech capabilities to achieve strategic goals and inflict significant damage on their adversaries. Terrorist organizations, as well as sovereign countries and established armies, can use simple tools, some of which are purchased online, and adapt them to their needs without necessarily relying on arms industries to challenge their enemies. These methods can prove effective against Western militaries that have chosen to defend against attacks by investing in capabilities such as fighter jets, sophisticated radar systems, naval vessels, and high-end ammunition.
This should serve as a wake-up call for countries to adapt to the evolving threats posed by inexpensive and accessible technologies. For example, countries should develop solutions to counter drones and other precision capabilities in areas where the Iron Dome system has only partial success. Most importantly, countries must closely monitor developments in their enemies’ capabilities as threats will continue to evolve. This understanding is crucial, as low-tech attacks can persist for extended periods and cause significant damage to both civilian and military targets.
The risk of escalation
The October 7 attack and subsequent active involvement of other terror groups and countries demonstrated how attacks of this nature can quickly escalate into full-scale wars with multiple participants. Besides Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, the Houthis, and Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria also became involved in the wide-scale war, although they were not initially part of the attack and could have chosen to remain uninvolved. These groups’ involvement also drew in the United States, the United Kingdom, and others who hit back against them.
This expansion of the conflict had profound consequences for the civilian populations and governments of the countries where these groups operate. More than one million civilians fled their homes in Lebanon during the armed conflict with Israel, following counterattacks by the Israel Defense Forces. This is not to mention the tremendous damage and suffering to the people in the Gaza Strip.
It is now clear that Hamas’s attack not only dramatically damaged Hamas itself, but also weakened the broader Axis of Resistance, as the region’s Iran-backed armed groups are known. This dynamic may lead some terrorist groups to reconsider their actions in the future. These groups likely will seek prior confirmation and support from their allies—meaning Iran, in the case of Hamas and Hezbollah—before any future large-scale operations.
The important lesson, once again learned from Israel’s harsh experience, is that large-scale, multi-arena wars can erupt unexpectedly, even when the parties’ interests do not fully align. Initially, it was not clear that the October 7 attack would draw Hezbollah into the conflict given that it had not been strong allies with Hamas, but the two groups took greater risks for one another than Western analysts expected. Their initial motivation was driven by hatred toward Israel, a commitment to their terrorist agenda, and a desire to avoid standing idle while another terrorist organization waged a large-scale fight against Israel. Additionally, they sought to avoid appearing less committed to terrorism or less opposed to Israel.
Therefore, countries must take this into account and understand that previously unconnected terrorist organizations may cooperate toward the same goal—requiring preparation for war scenarios involving multiple fronts. It is likely that their cooperation will be based on a shared ideology, such as resistance to Western influence. It is difficult to determine if external intervention can eliminate such collaborations between terrorist organizations, but terrorist groups must be made to understand that becoming involved in a full-scale war will come at a significant cost to them and their host countries.
In addition, the United States and Israel, with the support of Western allies, should focus on disrupting cooperation, however limited, between terrorist organizations during peacetime. These efforts should complement other steps aimed at reducing the empowerment of terrorist organizations in the future. This includes capitalizing on the vulnerabilities of the Axis of Resistance to disrupt its empowerment and arms transfers, and strengthen alternatives within their home countries to provide the civilian services previously offered by these organizations—ensuring that, unlike in recent decades, these groups do not take over their countries.
Additionally, the United States and Israel, along with Western allies, should apply pressure to the countries where these terrorist organizations originate to prevent them from using civilian areas for operations, including by threatening to withhold financial backing. Furthermore, those allies should take action against terror facilities in civilian areas as soon as they are identified. This could come in the form of military action, exposing these facilities so the terrorist organizations would be reluctant to use them, and pressuring countries to take action against these facilities themselves. The goal should always be to minimize civilian harm, reduce the threat posed by such facilities, and deter terrorist groups from operating in these areas due to the risk of destruction and loss of resources.
The psychological war
Following the catastrophe of October 7, Israel quickly regained its military effectiveness and succeeded in inflicting substantial damage on its enemies. This recovery was further strengthened by the remarkable support of its allies, which enhanced both its capabilities and strategic position. This model could also apply to other countries that may be attacked in the future.
Although Israel managed to recover from the shock of the October 7 attack, the broader perspective of the Gaza war highlighted the significant impact of psychological terror on both the civilian population and government decision-making. This represents a new type of warfare, one that involves not only mainstream media and news reports but also underground sources. Actions by Hamas, such as releasing hostage videos, spreading rumors, and leaking information, profoundly influenced public sentiment, contributing to the chaos seen in Israel, particularly in the war’s early months.
This is another shared lesson from both the Middle East conflict and the Russia-Ukraine war. It’s hard to predict whether future conflicts with terrorist organizations will necessarily involve these kinds of psychological threats and tactics. However, it is clear that the flow of information today—via social media, messaging apps, and other platforms—not only shapes public opinion but also influences the battlefield.
The conflicts across the Middle East that erupted in late 2023 will carry a lasting legacy for the entire region. As policymakers turn to the future of Gaza and other political negotiations, they should also take note of the lessons learned over the past sixteen months as they seek to reshape the region and reduce the impact of terrorism. This particular series of conflicts may be coming to a close, but the threat is not going away.
Maayan Dagan is a visiting research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.
Further reading
Image: Palestinians look on during the handover by Hamas of deceased hostages, identified at the time by Palestinian militant groups as Oded Lifschitz, Shiri Bibas and her two children Kfir and Ariel Bibas, seized during the deadly October 7, 2023 attack, to the Red Cross, as part of a ceasefire and hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip, February 20, 2025. REUTERS/Ramadan Abed TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY