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China’s perceived success as a mediating and reconciliatory power in the Middle East (West Asia), in the way of helping negotiate détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia, seems to have given Beijing a boost on what kind of role it can further play. For China’s leader Xi Jinping, this is an opportunity to place his country and leadership as a positive force in global governance and conflict resolution—something the United States (US) is markedly failing at.
China’s perceived success as a mediating and reconciliatory power in the Middle East (West Asia), in the way of helping negotiate détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia, seems to have given Beijing a boost on what kind of role it can further play.
As Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took off from Tel Aviv for his trip to the US, a first since the Israel–Hamas war in Gaza began in October 2023, 14 Palestinian factions and groups, including Hamas, Fatah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—both Hamas and PIJ are listed terror groups by multiple countries—congregated in China’s capital Beijing. Even though these talks were widely reported, the larger modalities of this engagement were kept under lock-and-key until China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s photo-op and statement with the attendees was released.
Wang instilled strong support behind this ‘new’ reconciliation drive. He highlighted three major points that China views as being critical towards any resolution of the ongoing war. First, smooth entry of humanitarian aid and a plan for post-war reconstruction. Second, centrality of the principle of ‘Palestinians ruling Palestinians’. And, finally, implementation of the two-state solution and Palestine’s entry into the United Nations. The former includes the recognition of Israel by those who still have not done so till now, which is a contentious ask by itself.
The two-day long meeting seems to have offered some dividends. According to a reported joint statement released at the end of the deliberations, the Palestinian groups “agreed on achieving a comprehensive national unity that includes all Palestinian factions within the frame of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).” Within the representing Palestinian grouping, the vast differences between Hamas and Fatah hold court. How these differences seem to have been ironed out, if at all, is unclear. In June 2007, both Hamas and Fatah fought a civil war after the latter lost the legislative elections in 2006. The win for Hamas’s ‘Change and Reform’ tickets was not just unpalatable to Fatah but, perhaps, even a shock to most other regional and international actors.
According to a reported joint statement released at the end of the deliberations, the Palestinian groups “agreed on achieving a comprehensive national unity that includes all Palestinian factions within the frame of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).”
However, while the issue of intra-Palestine conflicts of interests is not new, it is the entry of China as a perceived peacemaker and the political isolation which Hamas finds itself in in the aftermath of the October 8 terror attacks, that has, in large part, driven such an engagement forward. For Beijing, hosting these Palestinian groups is not a first. The previous meeting between Fatah and Hamas hosted by the Chinese government took place only recently in April. But for China, engagement with the likes of Hamas, Fatah, PIJ, and others, comes from its long-standing wish to be seen as a great power, but one which is non-interventionist, and stands for peace and reconciliation.
China manoeuvring itself to be the antithesis to the US
This is China placing itself as the antithesis to the US in particular, and the West in general. It has repeatedly raked up the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as examples of military-based policies to deeper political problems. China’s Special Envoy for the Middle East, Zhai Jun, was very active in the days after the October 8 attacks. Zhai made calls across the board to both regional leaders and those from the Global South, calling for a two-state solution, and an immediate end to hostilities from all sides. On 14 October 14 2023, Wang, talking to his counterpart in Saudi Arabia, criticised Israeli retaliation, demanded a stop to its “group punishment”, and highlighted the “historical injustice” against Palestine which cannot go on any longer. This position is reiterated to this day.
This increasingly vocal stance, and the willingness to take difficult decisions over mediation, does provide Beijing good headlines in the international arena. This is particularly true in the Muslim world and the Global South. However, China’s willingness to be engaged in the Middle East remains strategically distant. A failure of this version of Palestinian reconciliation will not cost Beijing too much. The blame for such a fall will come squarely on the Palestinian factions. It will, however, strengthen its position amidst the Arab world further. For a long while now, China’s policy for the region has been ‘we do what the Arabs want’. This is further substantiated by the fact that, despite the attempts to maintain balance, Beijing did not have much of a problem setting its bilateral with Israel ablaze. China having not condemned Hamas by name yet is a cornerstone of this dissolution. In the long term, China’s calculations come from its position within the ensuing great power competition with the US.
This increasingly vocal stance, and the willingness to take difficult decisions over mediation, does provide Beijing good headlines in the international arena. This is particularly true in the Muslim world and the Global South.
Today, the view is, China is helping to build a Palestinian peace consensus while US provides Netanyahu with all the weapons needed to flatten Gaza. The fact that over the past months Hamas has managed to gain significant victories in the battle for narratives, despite still holding dozens of Israelis hostage, helps the militant group during its fragile political state within Palestinian society in Gaza. Hamas leaders know, that if they do not recover politically, at any cost, they are destined to be a disbanded and lost organisation of the past.
China continues to have limited leverages in the Middle East. Its outreach to the likes of the Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah, amongst others, also puts it in a precarious bracket internationally. In part, Beijing hopes a clear stance on issues such as Gaza would garner it more support within the Global South, a loosely tied together grouping which is increasingly powerful, but also fragmenting, as a bi-polar order led by the US–China rivalry sets in. For the moment, China can, and will, bask in the light of getting the Palestinian factions to come to an agreement, albeit on paper, to cooperate. But is Beijing willing to commit deeply to the security of this region? Is it willing to be a guarantor both strategically and tactically? The answer for these tough questions, in all probability for now, remains a no.
Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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