On 28 January, Iran‘s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned Iranian officials to be “cautious and recognise their enemy” during negotiations, hinting through these comments at his tacit support for dialogue with the United States.
At a gathering of high-ranking officials, Khamenei, who was sitting next to Iran’s reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian, stated: “We must understand that behind diplomatic smiles lie hidden enmities and hatred. We should open our eyes and remain alert with whom we are dealing and speaking to.”
These remarks came just days after Pezeshkian extended an olive branch to the US in an interview with NBC earlier this month, where he expressed Iran’s willingness for “dialogue” based on equal footing and respect for Iran’s “dignity”.
This position adopted by both Khamenei and Pezeshkian was unexpected, given Tehran’s rigid stance after the 2020 assassination of Qassem Soleimani, arguably the country’s second-most influential figure, ordered by Donald Trump during his first term in office.
At the time, Khamenei unequivocally stated: “Even if the improbable were to happen and Iran engaged with the American regime at one point, it will never negotiate with this [Trump] administration. Everybody should know.”
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Iran’s new position could signal a potential policy shift, sparking optimism about a recalibration in its stance towards the Trump administration.
Trump now has three choices to address the Iranian government, each of which would inevitably impact Iran and its people.
He could implement a “maximum pressure 2.0” policy to coerce the Iranian government into negotiations and secure a new deal; he could permit or indirectly support Israel in striking Iran’s nuclear facilities; or he could collaborate with Israel in military operations targeting Iran’s nuclear sites, while preparing for the possibility of a broader war.
Trump’s public statements suggest a strong inclination towards the first option. He has consistently voiced opposition to US involvement in “endless wars”. But the second option risks rapid escalation into the third, as a severe Iranian retaliation to an Israeli strike could compel US intervention, potentially leading to a wider conflict.
Calculated signal
Evidence underscores Trump’s willingness to seek peace in the Middle East. Even before his reelection, Trump sent a clear message to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to end the Gaza war before his inauguration. This was not mere posturing; Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, reportedly pressured Netanyahu into a ceasefire.
A particularly striking development involves Columbia University professor Jeffrey Sachs, who recently argued in a video that Netanyahu played a key role in steering the US into two prior regional wars. On 7 January, Trump amplified these claims by sharing on Truth Social the video, in which Sachs provocatively refers to Netanyahu as a “deep, dark son of a bitch”.
Many viewed it as a calculated signal from Trump to Netanyahu: “I’m watching you.”
Trump does not make his decisions in isolation. Both Israel’s provocations and Iran’s reactions will influence his choices
Beyond the political intrigue, Trump’s pursuit of Middle East peace is rooted in personal economic pragmatism. Saudi Arabia plays a central role in this vision, offering substantial economic benefits while maintaining close ties with Trump and his inner circle. For Trump, Saudi-Israeli normalisation is a cornerstone objective – one that hinges on creating a stable and peaceful regional environment.
Some argue that the presence of Iran hawks, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, could influence the administration’s decisions on Iran. But this overlooks the fact that, due to Trump’s personality and inflated sense of self-importance, the final decision is always his.
In his first term, Trump fired or pressured 18 top officials to resign for failing to align with his policies, including his secretary of state, defence secretary, national security adviser and chief strategist.
All of that said, Trump does not make his decisions in isolation. Both Israel’s provocations and Iran’s reactions will influence his choices.
Energy concerns
Under Biden, Iran successfully circumvented US sanctions and increased oil exports from 300,000 barrels per day during Trump’s first term to approximately 1.7 million barrels per day.
But it is worth mentioning that late last year, Hojatollah Mirzaei, an economics professor and head of the Iran Chamber of Commerce’s research centre, revealed that 92 percent of Iran’s oil was sold to China at a 30 percent discount. Trump could most likely cut off this source of revenue, as he did during his first term.
In July, during his speech at the Republican National Convention, Trump noted that he had previously cut Iran’s oil exports by leveraging trade, stating: “[During my first term] I told China and other countries, if you buy from Iran, we will not let you do any business in this country, and we will put tariffs on every product you do send in of 100 percent or more.”
Against this backdrop, declining pressure in South Pars – one of the world’s largest natural gas reservoirs – has fuelled a severe energy crisis in Iran. South Pars supplies 64 percent of Iran’s electricity and 70 percent of its natural gas consumption, and the shortfall has contributed to widespread power outages in homes and industries, along with gas cuts to industrial sectors.
The annual losses from industrial blackouts alone are estimated at $20bn. Public frustration has surged, as evidenced by widespread outrage on social media over the ongoing outages.
Iran’s oil minister, Mohsen Paknejad, recently announced that $45bn in investment was needed to address the gas shortage – an unattainable figure under current US sanctions. Compounding the crisis, the devaluation of the rial has directly impacted livelihoods, particularly for the poor. During the past year, the rial, based on my calculation, has lost 50 percent of its value against the dollar.
Keep this picture of Iran’s economic situation in mind.
The path ahead
On the other side of the fence, in 2018, when Trump withdrew from the nuclear agreement, he outlined the type of deal he sought.
He said the 2015 deal’s sunset provisions were “totally unacceptable”. He added that the agreement didn’t even provide “the unqualified right to inspect many important locations, including military facilities” – a point of contention for the Iranian government, as such inspections could expose the country’s military secrets to “enemies”.
Trump also criticised the JCPOA for failing to “address the regime’s development of ballistic missiles that could deliver nuclear warheads”, and for overlooking Iran’s “destabilising activities, including its support for terrorism”.
It might seem that Trump occasionally retreats from his positions, but when it comes to an agreement with the Iranian government, he remains focused on securing a deal to bolster his prestige and demonstrate his superiority over the Democrats. His goal is to ensure Iran’s nuclear programme remains purely symbolic. But such an agreement is highly improbable, if not impossible.
Where will this lead? Two possible scenarios may unfold.
Firstly, as long as Trump perceives no significant nuclear threat from Iran, he could continue intensifying sanctions on the country, aiming to exert internal pressure to render the government fragile and unstable. The hope would be that, facing an existential threat, Iran would return to the negotiating table and consent to a deal meeting Trump’s baseline demands.
Whether his expectations would be met remains uncertain. But given the trajectory of Iran’s economic situation and the society’s explosive state under the unbearable pressure of living costs, another protest eruption within the next two years seems likely. Meanwhile, whether the Iranian government will crumble under the weight of another severe wave of protests as sanctions tighten remains to be seen.
In the second scenario, if Iran escalates its nuclear threats to a level where Trump perceives a serious risk – based on US or Israeli intelligence, or Netanyahu’s influence – then the options of direct or indirect conflict would come into play. These could involve granting Israel freedom to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, or collaborating in such an attack.
How would the Iranian government react, and where could this military confrontation lead? Would the Iranian government collapse? Statements by Revolutionary Guards commander Hossein Salami – that “the outcome of the battle is determined on the ground”, implying the system won’t collapse from air strikes alone – will be tested in the days and months ahead.
But these are all pivotal questions as we await what comes next.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.