A picture shows two Russian S-400 Triumf missile systems at the Russian Hmeimim military base in … [+] Latakia province in northwest of Syria on December 16, 2015. (PAUL GYPTEAU/AFP via Getty Images)
As part of its drawdown from Syria following the dramatic collapse of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in early December, Russia has packed up some of its most advanced S-400 and S-300 air defense missile systems. The transfer marks the end of an era when Russia played an arguably oversized role in determining which countries could operate in Syria’s contested airspace for almost a decade.
The Wall Street Journal reported that Russian cargo planes have transported S-400 and S-300 radars out of Syria to bases in eastern Libya, controlled by the Russian-allied warlord Khalifa Haftar.
Haftar would doubtlessly welcome the deployment of these strategic air defense systems as a counterbalance against his Turkish-backed rival, the UN-recognized government in Tripoli, which unsurprisingly opposes Russia reinforcing its bases in the divided country. Haftar fought that government in 2019-20 when his forces besieged and tried to seize the capital, only to be routed by a counteroffensive supported by Turkish drones. The conflict has remained stalemated ever since. Rumors abound in 2020 that Russia deployed S-400s or S-300s to eastern Libya, which, as noted at the time, could have helped solidify that stalemate. Haftar has long been “obsessed” with having Russian air defenses deployed in the areas he controls to avoid a repeat of that year’s humiliating rout.
Retaining S-400s in Syria no longer serves Russia’s strategic interests since the systems became more exposed following the takeover of the country, including Latakia, by anti-Assad armed groups.
“The removal of S-400 missile defense systems from their positions at the Hmeimim air base appears to be the first clear sign that preparations are underway for the base’s full evacuation,” wrote analyst Anton Mardasov in Al-Monitor. “However, by Dec. 8, the continued presence of these expensive systems had already become irrelevant when opposition forces entered the town of Jableh, from where they could effectively shell the entire base.”
When Russia initially intervened in the Syrian civil war to prop up Assad’s regime in late September 2015, it deployed Sukhoi fighter-bombers at Hmeimim airbase, located in the coastal Latakia province. The only air defenses it deployed at that base were medium-range point defense systems like the Pantsir-S1, a smart move considering the base later came under attack by explosive drones.
Off the Syrian coast, the Moskva was deployed in the early stages of Moscow’s air campaign with its naval S-300s to provide additional coverage. Incidentally, that was the same guided missile cruiser Ukraine sank in the Black Sea on Apr. 13, 2022, another striking reminder of how times have changed.
When Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 Fencer bomber that briefly entered its airspace on Nov. 24, 2015, Russia slapped sanctions on Turkey, resulting in months of tense relations between the countries. During that time, Russia deployed S-400s to Hmeimim, greatly enhancing its air defense coverage over Syria, at least in theory.
“The S-400 is one of Russia’s most modern air defense systems with an extraordinary reach,” the BBC reported at the time. “From the airbase near Latakia the S-400’s surface-to-air missiles could strike targets in an arc that takes in much of Israel; the eastern Mediterranean (including Cyprus where British jets are based); and northwards to cover a large part of Turkey beyond the Syrian border.”
However, Syria’s topography posed challenges for these strategic air defenses. As military aviation writer Tom Cooper noted in 2017, Hmeimim was mere miles from the Alawite Mountains, severely restricting their radar coverage, and with that, the S-400 interceptor missiles’ potential to reach their maximum advertised ranges of up to 250 miles.
Still, the S-400 deployment enhanced Russia’s stature, at least symbolically. Turkey apologized for the Su-24 shootdown by mid-2016, and shortly after the Jul. 15, 2016, coup against Ankara, ties between Ankara and Moscow grew ever warmer, culminating in Russia delivering S-400s to the NATO member country in July 2019.
“Moreover, were it not for the Syrian civil war, Turkey would almost certainly not have bought the Russian-made S-400 missile system, which further strained its relationship with the U.S.,” wrote Galip Dalay in December 2024. “Likewise, with Assad’s downfall, Turkey has broken its previous geopolitical encirclement by Russia on its northern, southern (Syria), and eastern borders.”
Turkish cross-border operations into northern Syria from 2016 to 2019, which invariably targeted Kurdish-led forces, hinged on prior approval from Russia to use Syrian airspace, underscoring Moscow’s purported control over much of the country’s airspace.
Shortly after Russia intervened in the conflict, Israel established a deconfliction mechanism to prevent their two overlapping air campaigns from clashing. Israel repeatedly cited the Russian military presence in Syria as justification for not supplying Ukraine with armaments following Russia’s 2022 invasion.
At the same time, Israel could have dominated Syrian airspace if it chose to but, more for political rather than military reasons, avoided unnecessarily clashing with Russia. However, there were still some tense periods.
For example, in October 2018, during an Israeli airstrike in western Syria, an antiquated Syrian S-200 missile launched against the incoming Israeli jets hit a nearby Russian military transport killing all 14 Russian military personnel on board. An enraged Russia blamed Israel and transferred an additional S-300 to the country, claiming it was for modernizing Syria’s air defenses. In reality, it was crewed exclusively by Russian troops and was only fired off once with no radar lock in May 2022 during an Israeli airstrike. Ultimately, Russia removed the “Syrian” S-300 from the country the following August, demonstrating how it never belonged to Damascus to begin with. (Interestingly, when Russia shipped out that system, it flew the radar from Hmeimim and loaded the battery onto a ship at the Tartus naval base. It’s likely moving the S-300s and S-400s in a similar way today.)
In retrospect, the whole “Syrian S-300” episode aptly demonstrated how symbolic Russia’s control over Syrian airspace truly was.
Less than a month before its fateful February 2022 all-out invasion of Ukraine, Russia launched joint air patrols with the Syrian Air Force along the Golan Heights frontier with Israel. It claimed these would be a regular occurrence. Moscow previously announced it had linked its air defenses with those of the regime, potentially increasing the threat to any external aircraft unwelcome by Moscow and Damascus. Incidentally, between 2018 and 2020, Israel estimated it destroyed one-third of Syria’s air defenses during escalations with Damascus and Iranian forces and their militia allies in the war-torn country.
Shortly after Assad’s ouster, Israel moved in and relentlessly bombed the remaining stockpiles of the Syrian military, including in Latakia and Tartus, with complete impunity. In early October 2024, weeks before Assad’s fall, Israel bombed an ammunition warehouse in Jableh near Hmeimim, seemingly with little regard for how Russia might respond.
Today, Israel is probably less worried than ever about what Russia thinks of its frequent incursions into Syrian airspace. The same goes for Turkey, which may soon play a more significant role in policing Syria’s airspace in Russia’s place.
Whatever ultimately happens, it’s already abundantly clear that the days of Russia having sway over who flies in Syrian skies have come and gone.